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Where	does	 color	 exist?	As	 a	 property	 of	 light	 in	 "red	wavelengths,"	 as	 a	 neural	
calculation	 by	 retinal	 photoreceptors,	 or	 as	 a	 calculation	 in	 the	 brain?	 The	
perceptual	 couplings	 of	 synesthesia,	 along	 with	 color	 constancy	 and	 colored	
shadows,	suggest	that	color	is	not	a	property	of	objects:	In	order	to	be	biologically	
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The Journal asked me to comment on synesthesia and the question, “Do colors exist and do 
they belong to the real world?”.  
First, a definition: Sharing a root with an–esthesia (“no sensation”), syn–esthesia means 
“joined” or “coupled sensation”. Synesthesia is not a neurological disorder but rather a 
perceptual trait like having perfect pitch or the ability to taste phenylthiocarbamide (PTC) 
as bitter while the majority taste nothing. Four percent of the population (~1 in 23 
individuals) carry the genes for it. It runs strongly in families as an autosomal dominant 
trait (Vladimir Nabokov’s family is a famous example) but it is not expressed with 100% 
fidelity. This leaves a smaller number of 1 in 90 exhibiting some kind of overt synesthesia.  
 Unlike zombies, a synesthete does not replace one sense for another but rather adds 
qualia to the original, or inciting, sensation. Thus, a synesthete may not only hear my voice, 
music, or an ambient sound but additionally see it, taste it, or feel it as a physical touch. The 
most common manifestations are perceiving days of the week as colored, followed by 
seeing letters and numerals as colored whether printed or spoken1. Figure 1, representing 
19,000 individuals, illustrates that certain varieties cluster. If you have one type of 
synesthesia, you then have a 50% chance of having a second, third, or fourth type2. 
                                                
1 For further examples see R. Cytowic, Synesthesia, MIT Essential Knowledge Series, MIT Press, Cambridge 
Ma. 2018. 
2 Figure 1. If graphemes are experienced as colored (upper left circle), then a synesthete will likely see other  
rote sequences as colored, too, but not combinations from other clusters. The fact that experience clusters like 
this tells us that synesthesia is not a singular thing but should be thought of as an umbrella term for outwardly 
evident couplings that result from a number of inward neurological mechanisms. 
     
 






 With respect to visual qualia, synesthetes never see pictorial images, but rather generic 
shapes such as lines, crosshatchings, circular forms, spirals, and tunnels. Imagine 
something like fireworks: a configuration arises, moves, scintillates a bit, and then fades 
unless the stimulus persists to replenish the photisms. A strong emotional charge is often 
present, too, as it is in the case of fireworks. 
 
Explaining color has been an historical challenge for philosophers. It has likewise been a 
challenge for scientists. While the Young and Helmholtz theories predominated for many 
years, neither could account for the perceptual phenomena of color constancy or colored 
shadows. That is, a sheet of paper will continue to look white, an apple red, and a banana 
yellow despite wide variations in light intensity and wavelength composition coming from 
tungsten, fluorescent, LED, or daylight sources. This is color constancy: to the eye, 
measurably different stimuli look the same. We can demonstrate colored shadows by 
lighting an object with a colored light, say a red one. The shadow cast looks black as we 
expect it to. But when white light is added, the shadow suddenly turns green even though 
     
 






there is nothing but white light falling on it. With a yellow light and white light the shadow 
looks blue, and so on. Where, then, do the colors come from? 
 If the three retinal photoreceptors acted like spectrophotometers (as intensity meters 
with peaks in three different parts of the spectrum) then an object’s color would be obliged 
to change dramatically as the quality of illumination changed. Moving objects would be 
especially confusing and color would have little biological utility given that the 
composition and intensity of daylight changes moment to moment depending on the sun’s 
angle, shadows, cloud cover, and the amount of water vapor and particulate matter in the 
air. The fact that colors remain constant indicates that our photoreceptors do not operate 
this way. The redness so evident in daylight film exposed to incandescent light never 
bothers us when we step indoors to tungsten–lit rooms. Our nervous system does not 
perceive the extra red because it does not depend on the flux of radiant energy reaching the 
eye to determine color. So what does it depend on? 
 The Retinex theory, promulgated by optical scientist Edwin Land, inventor of Polaroid, 
seemed to explain these two puzzles and answer the question of whether color exists in the 
real world or only in perceiving minds. Land published his experiments starting in 1955 
and refined the theory with collaborator John McCann into the 2000’s. His work had the 
flavor of Gestalt psychology in that it relied more on demonstration than logical argument. 
He showed that differently colored rectangles lit to send the same information to the brain, 
still registered as different colors despite the fact that the only information reaching your 
eye that you know of is the wavelength composition of the light coming from a given area. 
Land’s demonstrations flummoxed those who contended that physical wavelength 
determines color perception. It wasn’t until 1989 that V4, the unique color area in the 
human brain, was discovered thanks largely to Samir Zeki at University College, London 
and his decades of electrode penetration studies in macaque visual cortex. Zeki’s 
experimental designs relied explicitly on Land’s Retinex framework. 
 What V4 does is compute a ratio between a given point and all surrounding points, and 
then assign a color to a surface. Color has enormous utility compared to its biological cost 
because it assigns stable features in an otherwise constantly changing visual world. To 
     
 






answer the original question above, color most assuredly exists but not in the external 
world. One often hears that something looks red because it reflects more red wavelengths. 
But there is no such thing as “red wavelengths”. Even Newton when explicating his prism 
experiments said, “There are no colors in the rays”. Colors exist only in a perceiving mind, 
within the silent darkness of an individual’s skull.  
 
 
Why does color figure so prominently in synesthesia? Perhaps because vision constitutes 
85% of the brain’s inputs and the color system operates at a low resolution compared to 
other aspects of vision such as form, contrast, spatial location, stereopsis, and movement. 
Video 1 illustrates the separation of color from form: despite the boundary, the brain makes 
the color flow into the line. Similarly, when early engravers tinted black–and–white prints 
they understood that they could run outside the lines without worry (figure 2)3. The 
“watercolor effect” allows colors to bleed beyond boundary lines because the color network 
has fewer cells and a greater receptive field. Loosely applied color appears to conform to 
high–contrast outlines even though actually it does not. 
                                                
3 Figure 2. The “watercolor effect” allows for loose application of color. The low-resolution of the color 
system makes it appear to adhere to higher-resolution linear boundaries.  
     
 







 Carol Steen, a well–known sculptor and painter lamented to me the inability to match 
her painting palette to the synesthetic colors she saw. I explained that synesthetes perceive 
the additive colors of light (RGB) rather than the subtractive colors of pigments (CMYK) 
(figure 3). For all the talk of their “gorgeous colors”, synesthetes admit to seeing “weird”, 
“ugly”, or “washed out” colors that they normally would not pick. One individual with an 
S–cone deficiency that renders him unable to distinguish blues and purples speaks of seeing 
“Martian colors”. That is, he sees synesthetic colors he is incapable of seeing in the real 
world. The reason such “unnatural” colors exist is that V4 is being stimulated via non–
optical routes such as graphemes, phonemes, tastes, or sounds. 
     
 






 There is of course an enormous difference between the idea of synesthesia and the 
perceptual phenomenon. Pseudo–synesthetes freely engage in deliberate contrivances as in 
Georgia O’Keefe’s paintings, “Music: Pink and Blue”, Alexander Scriabin’s Prometheus, 
which features a light organ and a separate stave for its notation, and Sir Arthur Bliss’ 
“Color Symphony”. By contrast true synesthetes include composer Olivier Messiaen, who 
invented his modes of limited transposition method specifically to convey the colors that 
natural sounds evoked; Wassily Kandinsky whose four types of synesthesia influenced his 
paintings; and Vladimir Nabokov who referenced synesthesia ad lib throughout his fiction 
and whose family manifested the trait over three generations (his son Dmitri wrote about 
his famous family in the afterword to Wednesday is Indigo Blue). More contemporary 
synesthetic artists include Billy Joel, Lady Gaga, David Hockney, and Pharrell Williams. 
 Efforts throughout history tried to establish a fixed correspondence between color and 
sound. Sir Isaac Newton was perhaps the first, Goethe took a stab at it in Zur Farbenlehre 
(Theory of Color, 1810), and Kandinsky most famously sought the translation key for 
correspondences among all the senses in Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1911). Alas, these 
efforts failed because there is no universal translation algorithm equating one sense to 
another. That should be apparent from the fact that synesthetic perception is idiosyncratic; 
even twins with colored hearing do not experience the same colors. It is too easy to equate 
visual wavelength with color and then conflate wavelength with auditory Hertz. Sound 
frequency does have a point–to–point correspondence along the inner ear’s basilar 
     
 






membrane as well as along Heschl’s transverse temporal gyrus (i.e., it is tonotopically 
organized). But neither wavelength nor perceived color has a similar kind of one–to–one 
representation in the retina or anywhere else in the visual system.  
 There do exist, however, regular and orderly psychophysical correspondences among 
certain sensory dimensions (figure 3)4. For instance, both synesthetes and non–synesthetes 
say that higher tones are smaller than low ones, and that louder ones are brighter than soft 
ones. Even smell maps to lightness and intensity as both chefs and psychologists know. 
Both say that dark liquids taste and smell stronger than their equivalent pale versions while 
the unsuspecting say that white wine surreptitiously colored red, smells and tastes like red 
wine. And of course Mom was right when she scolded that your eyes were bigger than your 
stomach. We do eat with our eyes. “This looks delicious”, we say, never the future-oriented, 
“This is going to taste great”. 
 
 
Skeptics often accuse synesthetes as “merely remembering” past associations from 
refrigerator magnets, making it up to get attention, or else suffering from residual 
hallucinations from prior drug use. Aside from all the failed attempts to prove that 
synesthesia is a learned association, standard psychometric tests confirm that synesthesia is 
indeed perceptual. For example, if I project a numeral into your peripheral vision while 
                                                
4 Figure 3. Lawful, orderly correspondences exist among sensory dimensions. See text.  
     
 






instructing you to look straight ahead, you can still make it out. But if I then surround it 
with other numerals it becomes invisible, a phenomenon called masking. Synesthetes 
likewise can’t make out the masked digit but will say things like, “It must be ‘7’ because I 
see green”. Similarly, if I show you a matrix of 5’s in which I’ve embedded a hidden figure 
made of mirror–image ‘2’s, it will take a while to search and find it. But synesthetes who 
see 5’s as differently colored from 2’s quickly pick out the embedded form.  
Experiments like these tell us that synesthetic coupling happens early in perception, 
perhaps before one is even aware of a stimulus at all. This has obvious relevance to the 
study of consciousness, as well as to orthodox notions of modularity and functionalism. 
Jeffrey Gray argued that synesthesia was the death of functionalism. Against the claim that 
“qualia are the functions (input–transformations–behavior) by which they are supported, 
and nothing more,” stand the incompatible conditions of (a) 1 function → 2 qualia and (b) 2 
functions → 1 quale. Synesthesia constitutes incompatibility (a) [1].  
 People frequently ask whether synesthetes aren’t overwhelmed by their extra 
perceptions. The answer is a definitive no. They love their experience. To be without the 
trait would be as odious as a non-synesthete going blind. As to whether they get confused, 
imagine a blind friend commiserating, “Oh you poor thing! Everywhere you look you’re 
always seeing something. Doesn’t it drive you crazy to always have to see everything?”. Of 
course not. Seeing the normal texture of reality. Synesthetes simply have a different texture 
of reality than most of us.  
 Synesthesia is normally one-directional: sound to sight, but not the reverse. In the small 
proportion of individuals in whom it is bidirectional, it tends to overwhelm them. A British 
music teacher who underwent extensive testing to verify her bidirectionality lived a 
relatively quiet life in the country. For a BBC documentary she gamely agreed to walk 
about Piccadilly Circus at night. The “screaming” color sounds of the neon lights quickly 
made her ill, and she asked to be taken away. 
 I’ll close with the assertion that all of us are synesthetic, except that in 96 percent of us 
these common cross-couplings do not arise to consciousness. Aside from the corresponding 
dimensions of sensation mentioned above, we all lip read, which explains why even bad 
     
 






ventriloquists convince an audience that the dummy is talking. Cinema likewise persuades 
us that dialogue emanates from an actor’s mouth on screen rather than the surrounding 
speakers. And the louder the surrounding environment gets the more we have to look at a 
person to see what they are saying. Metaphor (which by definition reveals the similar in the 
dissimilar) illustrates counterintuitively that it is not poetic or a highly abstracted trope of 
language, but rather a physically concrete experience that antedates language. Without 
synesthesia, metaphors like “loud tie” or “warm color” would be incomprehensible. 
Perceptual similarities such as “dark is also strong” yield to synesthetic equivalences, such 
as “I know it’s 2 because it’s white”. These then evolve into spatial metaphors, such as 
“Good is up, bad is down,” or ontological metaphors like “Ideas are light”. Language 
elaborates the latter into phrases like “Brilliant!” “That was a bright idea”, or “I see what 
you’re saying”.  
 And thus we have a continuum in which synesthesia is closer to concrete sensory 
experience than to the abstractions of language and high-order thinkng: 
Perception → Synesthesia → Metaphor → Language 
 
 
